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INTRODUCTION 
Bridgette Patrick was pulled over during a routine traffic stop by 
an Alabama police officer who asked to see her driver’s license. After 
checking her license, the officer informed her that she was under 
arrest; a warrant had been issued against her in Shelby County, 
Alabama for writing fraudulent checks. Despite Patrick’s bewildered 
protests, the officer escorted her to the county jail, where she was 
able to demonstrate that her handwriting did not resemble that on the 
fraudulent checks. Nevertheless, the jail detained her overnight 
because of outstanding warrants for her arrest in other jurisdictions. 
The next morning, a police officer from another city picked up 
Patrick at the county jail in order to then arrest her in his city. Patrick 
then endured the same humiliating process of arrest, photographing, 
fingerprinting, and incarceration. Over the course of nearly ten days, 
she was shuttled from one city or county to the next to undergo the 
same process in a total of eleven jurisdictions. 
Nearly two years before this nightmare began, Patrick had been 
notified by two other cities that they had warrants out for her arrest 
for writing fraudulent checks; she was able to prove her innocence of 
these allegations and the charges were dismissed. Patrick ultimately 
learned that an imposter had stolen her identity, opened a bank 
account in her name, and written nearly $1,500 in bad checks using 
her identity. The bank had opened a checking account for this 
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temporary driver’s license as identification. The individual gave no 
permanent address, the individual’s signature differed from that on 
the temporary driver’s license, and the bank teller did not ask the 
individual for her Social Security number. Patrick was a victim of 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud, which occurs when a 
financial institution1 negligently opens a bank account or extends 
credit to an identity thief. In Patrick v. Union State Bank,2 the 
Alabama Supreme Court permitted identity theft victim Bridgette 
Patrick to recover from the bank that negligently enabled an imposter 
to steal her identity and subject her to criminal liability.3 
This Note will review the brief history of the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud claim in state courts across the country. 
This cause of action has received harsh treatment from most courts 
that have considered it. However, this Note defends the cause of 
action and shows that it can play a useful and necessary role in 
protecting victims of identity theft from financial institutions that 
negligently open bank accounts or extend credit to identity thieves. 
Part I provides a review of the broader concerns surrounding the 
issue of identity theft and considers the magnitude of the problems 
resulting from it. Part II examines the competing views on the issue of 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud. Part III argues that the 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim deserves further 
consideration from future plaintiffs and more favorable treatment 
from courts because current legislative efforts are inadequate and, 
more importantly, because traditional negligence principles suggest 
that financial institutions have an affirmative duty not to enable 
identity theft. 
I.  IDENTITY THEFT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING THREAT 
Identity theft has become an increasingly devastating nationwide 
concern in recent years.4 As Professor Sabol defines it, “Identity theft 
 
 1. Throughout this Note, the term “financial institution” refers to any organization that 
may be potentially responsible for enabling identity theft, typically including banks and credit 
issuers. 
 2. 681 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1996). 
 3. Id. at 1372; see infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 4. See generally Michael Higgins, Identity Thieves: Stealing Someone’s Identity to Buy 
Everything from Cars to Toys and Leaving the Real Person’s Credit Rating in Ruins May Be the 
Perfect Crime Because There is Little That Can Be Done to Prosecute It. Until Now., 84 A.B.A. 
J., Oct. 1998, at 42, 42 (discussing “what in an increasingly cashless society ha[s] become almost 
the perfect crime: identity theft”). “By posing as someone else, thieves found, they could steal in 
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occurs when a person steals another person’s name, address, social 
security number, or other identifying information in order to commit 
fraud.”5 It arises most commonly in four contexts: credit card fraud, 
communications services fraud, bank fraud, and fraudulent loans.6 
 
a way that left victims powerless and police uninterested.” Id. In the mid-1990s, public 
awareness of identity theft began to rise with the burgeoning number of complaints made to 
government officials, as well as business and consumer groups. See id. at 43. 
Identity theft poses a serious problem to the American public: the FBI has deemed it 
among the fastest-growing white-collar crimes in the United States, and the FTC announced 
that it was 2002’s most frequent consumer complaint. Timothy C. Barmann, Laptop Theft Has 
Bank Rhode Island Issuing Alert, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Dec. 19, 2003, at G1. 
Some commentators have gone so far as to call identity theft an “epidemic.” See, e.g., Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003) (“Credit-based 
identity theft emerged as a significant problem in the 1980s, hitting epidemic proportions . . . in 
the 1990s.”) (footnote omitted); Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft 
Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 364 n.75 (2003) (discussing responses 
taken by lenders and merchants to the “identity theft epidemic”). Even members of the United 
States Senate have used this dramatic language: “The epidemic of identity theft jeopardizes the 
financial well being of tens of millions of consumers[;] if left unchecked, it threatens the basis of 
our credit economy.” Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the Real John Doe 
Please Step Forward?, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 483, 488 (1998) (citing the Senate Committee on 
Public Safety, Committee Analysis of A.B. 156, at 4 (July 15, 1997)). 
The results of a random nationwide survey conducted in March and April of 2003 show 
that identity theft does indeed appear to have reached such epidemic proportions. See Federal 
Trade Commission—Identity Theft Survey Report (Sept. 2003), at 4, at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf (last visited June 30, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
A reported 4.6 percent of Americans ages 18 and over were victimized by some form of identity 
theft in the past year. Id. From these results, the FTC calculates that approximately 10 million 
Americans were victims of identity theft in the past year alone. Id. Additionally, 12.7 percent of 
survey respondents indicated that they had been victimized by identity theft in the past five 
years. Id. 
 5. Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do 
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 166 
(1999). Identity thieves operate in myriad capacities: 
The range of identity fraud is stunning. Identity thieves have used the names of their 
victims to rent apartments, obtain employment, subscribe to online pornographic 
services, purchase guns, file fraudulent tax returns, obtain government documents or 
benefits—such as a driver’s license or Social Security card, open up telephone or 
utility services, open bank accounts, have surgery performed, file for bankruptcy (to 
obtain the benefits of the automatic stay), and even have children. 
Sovern, supra note 4, at 349–50 (footnotes omitted). 
 6. John B. Kennedy & Mary Wong, Recent Developments in U.S. Privacy Law, Including 
Post-September 11, 2001, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD 13, 22 (Francoise Gilbert, John 
B. Kennedy & Paul M. Schwartz eds., 2002). Credit card fraud occurs when an imposter opens a 
credit card account using another’s name. Id. With communications services fraud, an imposter 
opens a utility service account, such as a cellular phone or telephone account, in another’s name. 
Id. Bank fraud occurs when an imposter opens a bank account—checking or savings—in 
another’s name; the imposter may then draw funds from that account by writing fraudulent 
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Although much identity theft involves the Internet, it is not 
exclusively an Internet-based crime. Further, identity theft may occur 
with or without assistance from Internet resources.7 Regardless of the 
form identity theft takes, the victimized individual suffers through a 
traumatic experience.8 
The identity theft at issue in negligent enablement claims should 
not be confused with “account theft,” which occurs when stolen credit 
cards, debit cards, or financial records enable the thief to steal from 
the victim’s already-existing accounts.9 Although these related crimes 
are often discussed interchangeably, “true name fraud”—which 
occurs when a thief “us[es] a victim’s identifying information to open 
new accounts in the victim’s name”10—takes a greater toll on its 
victims than does account theft: their financial losses are more 
substantial, more difficult to discover, and take considerably longer to 
resolve.11 
Unlike crimes that involve a clear perpetrator and an obvious 
victim, identity theft harms both the individual whose identity has 
been stolen and the financial institution that issued the fraudulent 
account.12 Typically, the financial institution involved in the 
 
checks. Id. Finally, fraudulent loans are made when an imposter acquires a loan for a car, home, 
or other purchase in another’s name. Id. 
 7. Low-tech, old-fashioned acquisition methods, such as using lost or stolen personal 
information, “dumpster diving,” and searching through personnel files, result in a substantial 
portion of identity theft. Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law,  
30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 247–50 (2004); Stephen Mihm, Dumpster-Diving for 
Your Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003 (Magazine), at 42. However, use of sophisticated 
resources on the Internet facilitates some imposters by enabling them to access information 
both quickly and discreetly. See Timothy L. O’Brien, Officials Worried over a Sharp Rise in 
Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2000, at A1 (“[T]he Internet is making identity theft one of 
the signature crimes of the digital era.”). Additionally, the Internet may facilitate theft by 
enabling the thief to use a newly acquired phony identity in committing fraud. See Sovern, supra 
note 4, at 357. 
 8. See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
 9. Jennifer 8. Lee, Identity Theft Victimizes Millions, Costs Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2003, at A20. 
 10. Towle, supra note 7, at 242. Throughout the remainder of this Note, the generic term 
“identity theft” is used to denote both identity fraud generally and true name fraud specifically. 
However, when the distinction between the two categories is particularly important for 
purposes of comparison, this Note refers to true name fraud. 
 11. Lee, supra note 9. Not all victims of identity theft—even those in whose identity new 
accounts were opened—suffer out-of-pocket financial losses. Towle, supra note 7, at 255. 
 12. See Brandon McKelvey, Financial Institutions’ Duty of Confidentiality to Keep 
Customer’s Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1077, 1086 (2001) (“Current law, financial institutions, and law enforcement do not 
consider defrauded individuals as victims of identity theft because the individuals are not 
110305 HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2005  3:05 PM 
2005] IMPOSTER FRAUD 1267 
transaction absorbs the greatest part of the financial loss, so 
traditional perspectives on identity theft regard the institution as the 
victim and only occasionally recognize that the individual whose 
identity has been stolen is also a victim.13 
Although they are harmed by identity theft, financial institutions 
may also be implicated as facilitators of identity theft, even if they act 
responsibly, because they have the power to extend credit and possess 
a vast array of personal information about their customers. More 
focus has been placed on financial institutions’ responsibility to 
protect customers’ personal information than on their responsibility 
to take care in opening bank or credit card accounts.14 However, this 
latter role deserves greater scrutiny, because a “financial institution’s 
inadequate screening or verification often makes identity theft an 
easy crime.”15 
Victims of true name identity theft lack a satisfactory remedy. 
Although customers have recourse—in the form of both statutory16 
and common law claims17—individuals who never intended to become 
the institutions’ customers lack similar recourse because institutions 
generally do not owe noncustomers a duty of care.18 
As evidenced by Bridgette Patrick’s ordeal,19 the losses identity 
theft causes are not exclusively financial, and identity theft takes an 
immeasurable toll on its victims.20 One consumer advocate deemed 
 
responsible for the resulting debt.” (footnote omitted)); Sabol, supra note 5, at 167 (“Financial 
institutions are viewed by law as the primary victims of identity fraud and their direct financial 
loss tended to be viewed as the only loss involved. Federal laws that criminalize the conduct 
integral to identity theft did not recognize consumers as victims.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 13. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 43 (“The law enforcement logic was this: [the consumer] 
wasn’t legally obligated to pay any of the bills the impostor had run up. Therefore, [the 
consumer] wasn’t out any money. If anyone was a victim, it was the bank that issued the credit 
card.”); see also O’Brien, supra note 7 (“Consumers rarely face monetary losses related to 
identity theft because merchants or banks are typically the ones stuck with bogus credit card 
charges.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000) 
(forbidding financial institutions from disclosing customers’ financial information to the federal 
government). 
 15. McKelvey, supra note 12, at 1084. 
 16. See, e.g., infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 42–46 for a discussion of common law claims employed by identity theft 
victims. 
 18. See infra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. 
 19. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and Consumers: 
Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 585–86 (2002) (“[I]dentity theft 
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the ordeal of regaining one’s identity an “Orwellian nightmare”21 and 
an identity theft victim called it a “Kafkaesque maze.”22 Individual 
victims are often not taken seriously by courts—or society 
generally—and their experiences are viewed as merely unfortunate 
inconveniences because financial institutions shoulder the burden of 
the actual monetary losses resulting from identity theft.23 Identity 
theft victims suffer, however, in at least two quantifiable ways: they 
lose time and spend money in defending their cases.24 For example, 
victims devote an average of 600 hours to clearing their names.25 
When victims’ lost income was considered in the efforts taken to clear 
their records, the average amount lost was a staggering $16,971.26 In 
addition to these losses, some victims also suffer severe emotional 
effects from both their victimization and from the frustrating process 
that they must endure to clear their names.27 Further frustrating their 
ability to clear their records is the fact that identity theft victims 
 
is not a victimless crime in which only institutions realize loss; the individual victims suffer real 
damage ranging from wasted time to hospitalization.”); Erin M. Shoudt, Identity Theft: Victims 
“Cry Out” for Reform, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 339, 356 (2002) (discussing the “human costs” identity 
theft victims suffer as they “bear the burden of regaining their financial health and restoring 
their credit history”); see infra notes 24–28. For a personal account of a particular identity theft 
victim’s struggle with regaining her identity, see Stacy Sullivan, How I Lost My Good Name, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at A19. 
 21. Higgins, supra note 4, at 47. 
 22. Sullivan, supra note 20. 
 23. E.g., Sabol, supra note 5, at 165 (discussing the frustrations of a California man in 
whose identity hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt were amassed from the purchase of a 
Mercedes Benz, expensive sports merchandise, and other extravagant items). 
 24. DALE PLETCHER, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 
2003, at 22 (2003), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf [hereinafter 
“Identity Theft Study”]. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Id. at 24. Victims’ out-of-pocket expenses in attempting to resolve their situations range 
from $4 to $29,996, with an average of $1,495 per victim. Id. at 25. 
 27. See id. at 35–39 (providing both a quantitative and a qualitative review of the emotional 
toll that identity theft takes on an individual victim). Many identity theft victims must forego 
opportunities as a result of their victimization: 
It’s little wonder that victims feel violated, helpless and angry. They are unable to 
rent an apartment, get a job, qualify for a mortgage, buy a car, all because someone 
else’s bad credit history is recorded on their credit report. Essentially the entire 
burden of this crime is placed on the shoulders of the victims. 
Beth Givens, Identity Theft: How it Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative Solutions, 
Presentation at the National Organization for Victim Assistance, at http:// 
www.privacyrights.org/AR/id_theft.htm (July 12, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see 
also Sovern, supra note 4, at 384 (detailing how identity theft victims suffer “lost 
opportunities—such as the loss of a home because a damaged credit record made it impossible 
to qualify for a mortgage”). 
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typically do not learn of their victimization for several months after 
the theft has occurred, at which point they must begin the lengthy and 
harrowing process of attempting to regain their identities.28 True 
name fraud victims suffer losses more often than other identity theft 
victims: although only one quarter of victims whose existing accounts 
were stolen were forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses, half of the 
victims in whose names new accounts were opened incurred out-of-
pocket expenses.29 
In an attempt to ameliorate the effects of identity theft, Congress 
has enacted several statutes,30 the most prominent and widely used 
being the Fair Credit Reporting Act.31 The FCRA provides 
consumers with a private right of action for a credit reporting 
agency’s willful or negligent noncompliance with any of the duties 
imposed by the FCRA.32 Under this FCRA provision, consumers may 
 
 28. See PLETCHER, supra note 24, at 8. In the past few years, victims have discovered the 
theft of their identities more quickly; whereas the average victim in 2000 did not discover the 
victimization for 12 to 18 months, the average victim in 2003 learned of the theft within one to 
six months. Id. 
 29. Towle, supra note 7, at 255. 
 30. In addition to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, discussed infra note 31, statutes include 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000) [hereinafter “FDCPA”]. “The 
FDCPA seeks to ‘eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person 
or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.’” Baker v. Citibank,  
13 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988)). Other statutes attempting to protect against fraud include the Truth 
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (2000), and the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA Patriot 
Act”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles and sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
Commentators are skeptical of the efficacy of both state and federal legislation. “[E]ven 
the staunchest advocates of the proposed reforms admit that they will not solve the [identity 
theft] problem. Identity theft is out of control.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory 
and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89, 90 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 
108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) [hereinafter “FCRA”]. In enacting the FCRA, “Congress  
sought to protect the needs of commerce and facilitate the dispersion of credit information 
while, at the same time, requiring accuracy and confidentiality.” Stafford v. Cross Country 
Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (citation omitted). The FCRA imposes 
obligations on three types of entities pertaining to consumer credit: consumer reporting 
agencies, consumer report users, and those who furnish information to consumer reporting 
agencies. Carney v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
See generally Couch, supra note 20 (discussing the FCRA’s applicability to identity theft). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) 
(discussing civil liability for willful noncompliance); id. § 1681o (addressing civil liability for 
negligent noncompliance). 
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recover their actual damages,33 attorney fees, and costs; when the 
credit reporting agency has acted willfully, the consumer may also 
recover punitive damages.34 Another statutory enactment, the 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act,35 “makes identity 
theft a federal offense and gives victims rights and means to be 
compensated for their losses.”36 
In addition to federal legislation, state statutes provide limited 
recourse for victims of various forms of financial institution fraud.37 
The statutes employ a number of different remedies, such as 
providing identity theft victims with a cause of action against the 
identity thief,38 clearing the records of identity theft victims exposed 
to criminal proceedings,39 and requiring consumer reporting agencies 
to block from a victim’s file the false information placed in the file as 
a result of identity theft.40 Many of these “reactionary statutes” have 
 
 33. These damages are outlined in the statute as “actual damages sustained by the 
consumer as a result of” the willful failure to comply with FCRA requirements. Id. § 
1681n(a)(1)(A) (amended 2003). 
 34. Id. § 1681n, o (amended 2003). The text of the FCRA provides no definition of 
“willful,” but courts typically interpret this term to require a demonstration that the defendant 
“knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others.” 
Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 35. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 
Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(1) (2000)). 
 36. Sabol, supra note 5, at 165 (discussing the impact of this statute). Unfortunately, the 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act has proven to be an inadequate remedy for 
victims of true name fraud because it does not permit them to sue the financial institutions that 
caused their losses. See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
 37. Arizona was the first state to pass legislation deeming identity theft a felony. Id. at 168. 
This statute requires the identity thief to compensate the victim for both actual losses and the 
cost of restoring the victim’s credit. Id. However, this form of compensation has no value to an 
identity theft victim unless the thief is apprehended. 
If true name fraud victims wish to clear their records, they typically must take a proactive 
position. “Victims often have to play detective, coming up with clues, leads, and even the basic 
evidence that a fraud has been committed.” Margaret Mannix, Stolen Identity: It Can Ruin Your 
Credit, and That’s Just the Beginning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 1, 1998, at 48. 
 38. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-199 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-130 (2003); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 47-18-2104 to 2106 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.80 (2003); see also Consumer Rights 
Litigation Conference Report: Litigating Identity Theft Cases 20–21 (Oct. 26, 2003) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter “Conference Report”]. However, when the thief is 
unidentified or insolvent, this category of statutes provides the victim with no recourse. 
 39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-197 to 198 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-126(d) (2003); 
see also Conference Report, supra note 38, at 21. 
 40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-200 (2001); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.16.1 (2003); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-2.5(c) (2003); see also Conference Report, supra note 38, at 21. 
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been hastily drafted as attempts to counteract particular forms of 
identity theft only after they occur.41 
Statutory claims do not provide the only potential remedy for 
victims of identity theft.42 Plaintiffs have pled, and enjoyed varying 
degrees of success using, common law causes of action. These claims 
include defamation, invasion of privacy,43 malicious prosecution,44 the 
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress,45 breach of the 
tort duty of confidentiality,46 and the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud, which is discussed in detail in Part II. 
II.  USE OF THE NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT  
OF IMPOSTER FRAUD CLAIM 
Negligent enablement of imposter fraud is a narrowly framed 
cause of action that applies when the victim’s identity theft losses 
result from a financial institution’s negligence in assisting or 
furthering an identity thief’s efforts at stealing the victim’s identity.47 
Because this tort’s factual predicate arises only occasionally, this Part 
reviews the history of the use of negligent enablement of imposter 
 
 41. See McKelvey, supra note 12, at 1091–92. 
 42. The Uniform Commercial Code may also provide remedies to some categories of 
identity theft victims. A discussion of the UCC is, however, beyond the scope of this Note. 
 43. Defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence are specifically covered by the 
FCRA’s qualified immunity provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (amended 2003). Thus, in claims 
within the FCRA’s scope involving consumer reporting, identity theft victims must show malice. 
See Yutesler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1212 (D. Minn. 2003) (“1681h(e) [of 
the FCRA] allows for common law claims that are based on allegations that rise to the level of 
malice or willful intent to injure the consumer.”). For a sample of decisions permitting 
defamation claims, see id. (holding that the plaintiff’s “common law claim for defamation of 
credit is not preempted by the FCRA”); Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517,  
521–22 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining that a defamation claim is distinct from claims under the 
FCRA and establishing the elements of a common law defamation claim); Kronstedt v. Equifax, 
No. 01-C-0052-C, 2001 WL 34124783, at *19–23 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2001) (denying defendant’s 
summary judgment motion and permitting plaintiff to proceed with her defamation claim). 
 44. Sovern, supra note 4, at 402 & n.251; see also Nicholl v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 517 
S.E.2d 561, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing a victim of identity theft to claim malicious 
prosecution after a bad check warrant was sworn out against him by a vendor who failed to take 
the necessary steps to find that the signature was a forgery). 
 45. See Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 248, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendants on this and other claims). 
 46. See McKelvey, supra note 12, at 1102–10 (advocating the use of this common law claim 
in identity theft cases). 
 47. See Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1371–72 (Ala. 1996) (holding “that a 
bank owes a duty of reasonable care to the person in whose name . . . an account is opened to 
ensure that the person opening the account . . . is not an imposter”). 
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fraud and carefully addresses the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
recent judicial treatment of the negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud claim in Huggins v. Citibank.48 
Prior to Huggins, where the South Carolina Supreme Court 
refused to recognize the tort of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud, only a handful of plaintiffs have attempted to use negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud as a means of recovery for identity 
theft. Of these cases, only one decision permitted the injured victim 
to recover.49 In Patrick v. Union State Bank,50 victim Bridgette Patrick 
suffered substantial damage as a result of the identity thief’s actions, 
as detailed in the Introduction.51 She sued the bank that had opened 
an account for an imposter in her name without demanding proper 
identification.52 The Alabama Supreme Court explained that one 
person has “no duty to protect another from criminal acts of a third 
person” without “a special relationship or special circumstances.”53 
The court, however, found a special relationship between the bank 
and Ms. Patrick because it possessed an account in her name and held 
that the bank should be liable for negligently allowing the imposter to 
steal her identity.54 
 
 48. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003). 
 49. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1372. In Patrick, the imposter wrote nearly $1,500 worth of 
bad checks after opening a bank account in the victim’s name with only a temporary driver’s 
license as identification; the bank made no attempt to notify the account holder at the address 
provided on her temporary driver’s license. Id. at 1365–66. The Alabama Supreme Court held 
that a bank owed a duty of reasonable care to each individual for whom it opened an account. 
Id. at 1371. For a detailed account of the facts of the Patrick case, see supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. 681 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1996). 
 51. Warrants for Patrick’s arrest were issued in eleven jurisdictions. Id. at 1366. Following a 
traffic stop, a review of Patrick’s unearned criminal record led to a string of arrests; Patrick 
spent a total of ten consecutive days incarcerated at a series of city and county jails. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1367. 
 54. See id. at 1371 (“[W]e hold that a bank owes a duty of reasonable care to the person in 
whose name, and upon whose identification, an account is opened to ensure that the person 
opening the account and to whom checks are given is not an imposter.”). In a case prior to the 
epidemic of identity theft crimes, a state court of appeals affirmed a denial for summary 
judgment on a negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim, stating that a credit issuer could 
be liable for its negligent issuance of a credit card. See Bradshaw v. Mich. Nat’l Bank, 197 
N.W.2d 531, 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (“Issuing an unsolicited credit card and sending it to an 
incorrect address could be considered negligence.”). 
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Most other courts that have considered this cause of action have 
been much less hospitable to it.55 New York courts slammed the door 
on a plaintiff’s negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim with a 
blanket statement that New York does not recognize this cause of 
action.56 In Polzer v. TRW, Inc.,57 another negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud suit brought by an identity theft victim, the court 
disposed of the case summarily, briefly discussing the tort claim but 
not even mentioning the plaintiff’s particular allegations.58 In addition 
to its broad holding rejecting the negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud tort, Polzer also held that the plaintiffs had no negligence cause 
of action59 because the defendant bank had no special relationship 
with either the plaintiffs or the imposter and thus no duty to the 
victim.60 
A federal district court in Missouri denied a negligence claim on 
similar grounds.61 In Smith v. Citibank,62 the plaintiff alleged that 
defendant Citibank issued a credit card to his former employer in his 
name and, after an investigation, wrongfully determined that charges 
made to the account were authorized and thus appropriate.63 The 
Smith plaintiff had repeatedly asserted that he was not the bank’s 
customer, but he could not establish sufficient facts to impose a duty 
 
 55. The discussion and holding of the Patrick decision have been noticeably absent from 
the opinions of the few courts that have encountered—and refused to recognize—the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud tort. See Polzer, 256 A.D.2d at 248 (failing to mention the Patrick 
decision in its rejection of the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort). 
 56. See id. (holding that New York “does not recognize a cause of action” for the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud). 
 57. 256 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 58. Id. at 248–49. 
 59. Some plaintiffs have attempted to assert negligent enablement of imposter fraud and 
negligence claims as alternative causes of action, further adding to the confusion. 
 60. See id. at 248 (explaining that the plaintiffs failed to state a negligence claim “because 
[the defendants] had no special relationship either with the impostor who stole the plaintiffs’ 
credit information and fraudulently obtained credit cards, or with plaintiffs, with whom they 
stood simply in a creditor/debtor relationship”). Some courts, rather than using the “negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud” framework, analyze these claims under the rubric of 
“negligence” claims. 
 61. See Smith v. Citibank, No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-ECF, 2001 WL 34079057, at *2–4 (W.D. 
Mo. Oct. 3, 2001) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant bank owed a duty 
to the plaintiff as a noncustomer). This case did not specifically use negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud language but followed the same basic principles and was cited by the Huggins 
court in its negligent enablement of imposter fraud ruling. Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275, 
277 (S.C. 2003). 
 62. Smith v. Citibank, 2001 WL 34079057. 
 63. Id. at *1. 
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on other grounds.64 Smith decisively rejected the plaintiff’s claim of 
lender negligence,65 asserting that banks owe no duty to 
noncustomers.66 Additionally, the district court explained that the 
plaintiff was attempting to base his claim on the FCRA, even though 
his negligence claim was outside its parameters.67 When Kenneth 
Huggins asserted his claim before the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
the climate for the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort was 
indeed grim. 
In Huggins v. Citibank,68 the South Carolina Supreme Court 
answered a certified question it had received from the United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina: “Does South 
Carolina recognize the tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
and, if so, what are the elements of the tort and does plaintiff’s 
complaint state an actionable claim for the tort?”69 The court 
answered this question in the negative, holding that South Carolina 
does not recognize a cause of action for the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud.70 For negligence liability to attach, “the parties must 
have a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of 
care.”71 The court refused to extend the duty concept beyond 
“reasonable limits” and deemed the relationship between credit card 
issuers and potential identity theft victims as “far too attenuated” to 
create a duty between them.72 Although injury from credit card 
issuers’ negligence is foreseeable, “foreseeability alone does not give 
rise to a duty.”73 Thus, the court announced its agreement with New 
York’s Polzer court and decided not to impose “a legal duty of care 
 
 64. Id. at *2. By emphasizing that he was not a customer of the bank, the plaintiff denied 
himself an opportunity to assert a claim based on his status as a customer. See infra Part III.B 
(developing the importance of this distinction). 
 65. Smith v. Citibank, 2001 WL 34079057, at *2. 
 66. See id. at *2–3 (granting summary judgment on Smith’s negligence claim and noting the 
earlier dismissal of Smith’s defamation and invasion of privacy claims). 
 67. Id. at *3. 
 68. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003). 
 69. Id. at 276. 
 70. Id. at 278. Finding that no duty exists between a financial institution and a 
noncustomer, the court did not reach the latter questions. Id. at 276–77. The court nonetheless 
went on to state the elements of common law negligence. Id. at 276. 
 71. Id. at 277. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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between credit card issuers and those individuals whose identities 
may be stolen.”74 
Shortly before the Huggins decision, however, South Carolina 
courts had seemed to pave the way for claims of the type asserted by 
Kenneth Huggins. In Murray v. Bank of America,75 an identity theft 
victim sued the bank that opened an account for an imposter in her 
name.76 The court determined that a relationship giving rise to a duty 
of care was created when the victim went to the bank and asked it to 
close the account opened by an imposter in her name.77 The court 
took a unique position by concluding that, as one commentator 
explained it, the victim’s “demand for a remedy created the duty that 
gave rise to the remedy.”78 Oddly enough, however, the court did not 
cite or mention its earlier decision in Murray when it rejected the 
similar claim in Huggins. 
In the decisions refusing to permit recovery under the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud tort, the courts reached three 
overarching conclusions: recovery for identity theft should be 
determined by the legislature, not the courts;79 no duty exists between 
banks and the general public;80 and more particularly, no special 
relationship arises between banks and individuals in whose names 
they open accounts.81 Each of these conclusions is addressed and 
challenged in the following Part of this Note. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. 580 S.E.2d 194 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 76. Id. at 341. 
 77. See id. at 198 (“We find a relationship between the Bank and Murray arose sufficient to 
impose upon the Bank a duty of care when Murray went to the Bank seeking closure of the 
account.”). 
 78. Lawrence A. Young, The FACT Act: Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
(H.R. 2622) and Related Developments, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 36, 43 (2004). 
 79. See, e.g., Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277–78 (deeming recovery for identity theft a matter 
that should be left to the state and federal legislatures). See also infra Part III.A. 
 80. See, e.g., Software Design and Application, Ltd. v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 756, 760–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“Recent cases have held that absent extraordinary and 
specific facts, a bank does not owe a duty of care to a noncustomer.”) (citations omitted). See 
also infra Part III.B. 
 81. E.g., Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 248, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). See also infra 
Part III.B. 
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III.  THE FUTURE OF THE NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT  
OF IMPOSTER FRAUD CLAIM 
Although the fledgling tort of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud has been dealt a blow by recent court decisions, it remains a 
potentially useful claim that merits further consideration. 
Notwithstanding the best efforts of state and federal legislators, 
current statutory provisions fail to provide plaintiffs with recourse for 
the losses that have resulted from the theft of their identities. This 
Part contends that negligent enablement of imposter fraud remains a 
viable, and necessary, common law remedy for victims of identity 
theft caused by financial institutions’ negligence. Section A discusses 
the inadequacies of current statutes, such as the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act,82 as they apply to the factual scenarios alleged by an 
identity theft victim wishing to use the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud tort. This Section concludes that plaintiffs seeking 
redress from a financial institution that negligently facilitated an 
imposter’s fraud currently lack sufficient legal recourse without the 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort, and that their plight will 
continue to be excluded from future statutory enactments. Section B 
emphasizes the need for courts to acknowledge the special 
relationship between financial institutions and individuals in whose 
identities they extend credit. This Section then addresses how a victim 
can overcome the conceptual barriers often associated with this tort 
and successfully allege each of its elements. Finally, this Section 
argues that permitting a negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
cause of action would have several beneficial public policy outcomes. 
A. Legislation Does Not Sufficiently Protect All Identity  
Theft Victims 
Current federal and state statutes are inadequate because they 
are designed to protect credit providers and promote consumer 
confidence rather than to compensate victims of true name fraud.83 
Unless or until the federal government or individual states enact 
 
 82. FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (amended 2003). See also supra Part I. 
 83. See Couch, supra note 20, at 596; see also supra Part I. However, few plaintiffs have 
dared stray from statutory remedies to plead a cause of action for the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud. Perhaps due to the perceived inefficacy of this claim and its meager success rate, 
identity theft victims have generally resorted to more well-defined statutory approaches. 
Identity theft victims are forced to pursue ill-fitting statutory remedies when their common law 
claims are denied. See generally Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003). 
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statutes that satisfactorily protect individuals against financial 
institution negligence, courts should permit victims to plead negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud when the claim is appropriate for their 
particular factual situations.84 Because so few individuals will likely be 
able to benefit from the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort, 
there is unlikely to be sufficient political will to aid the victims of this 
fact-specific claim. 
In rejecting the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court in Huggins concluded by citing both 
state and federal legislation aimed at helping credit card fraud 
victims.85 The court asserted that despite the limitations on these 
remedies, “the legislative arena is better equipped to assess and 
address the impact of credit card fraud on victims and financial 
institutions alike.”86 The legislative arena, however, is not currently 
prepared to handle the claims of all identity theft victims, particularly 
those asserting that negligence in opening a bank account or issuing a 
credit card provided the source of their difficulties. By forcing 
identity theft victims to pursue statutory remedies exclusively, courts 
will in effect deny some of these victims recovery. 
Many claims of identity theft victims fall outside the scope of the 
FCRA’s coverage.87 Many financial institutions do not fit within the 
purview of the FCRA because it governs only those claims involving 
“consumer reporting agencies.”88 Because victims attempting to use 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud allege that negligent conduct 
occurred in the formation of a bank or credit card account, their 
claims arise at an earlier stage and do not implicate any actions of a 
credit reporting agency. 
The FCRA not only fails to reach many instances of identity 
theft, but it also provides little, if any, assistance for fraud within its 
 
 84. California led the way in this regard by enacting a law that provides consumers with the 
right to bring suit against negligent banks. See Michelle Heller, Barbara A. Rehm & John 
Reosti, Fighting Theft on Three Fronts, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 2003, at 20A (internal quotation 
omitted). If other states follow suit, identity theft victims will not need to use negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud. However, until such legislative solutions are introduced, this 
common law remedy can play an important role in protecting identity theft victims. 
 85. See Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (discussing several statutes, including the FCRA and 
South Carolina identity theft legislation). 
 86. Id. at 277–78. 
 87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2) (amended 2003) (providing exclusions to the “consumer 
reports” covered by the FCRA); see also supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (amended 2003) (defining the term “consumer reporting 
agency”). 
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reach. The FCRA includes two potentially overlapping provisions 
that preempt common law causes of action; in many cases, these 
provisions prevent identity theft victims from recovering.89 Credit 
furnishers receive absolute immunity when acting to fulfill their 
obligations under the FCRA.90 Additionally, offending credit 
reporters enjoy “qualified immunity” protection from state law claims 
encompassed within the FCRA unless their willful or negligent 
actions caused the victim’s harm.91 This qualified immunity provision 
“creates a defense a consumer must overcome to succeed on a state 
law claim against someone acting in a capacity that is regulated by the 
Act.”92 
The FCRA was not designed with identity theft concerns as a 
primary, or even a secondary, goal.93 The FCRA strives to “facilitate 
credit-based commerce while ensuring consumer confidence in such a 
credit-based system”—but identity theft undermines these efforts.94 
Congress has recently attempted to update the FCRA to respond to 
the pressing needs presented by identity theft. Although these recent 
amendments emphasize the need to protect against identity theft,95 
their improvements will be of little comfort to individuals victimized 
by a financial institution’s role in facilitating an imposter’s fraudulent 
acts. Even the banking industry acknowledges that although changes 
 
 89. For a discussion of competing views on the interaction between the FCRA’s absolute 
immunity and qualified immunity provisions, see Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 
2d 776, 784–88 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 90. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (amended 2003) (exempting “persons who furnish 
information to consumer reporting agencies”). The FCRA’s preemption provisions were set to 
expire on January 1, 2004, but they were permanently adopted by Congress in 2003. Id. 
 91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (amended 2003) (listing the limitations on liability for 
consumer reporting agencies and those who provide information to consumer reporting 
agencies); see generally supra note 43. 
 92. Stafford, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 782; see also Shaner v. Fleet Bank, 132 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (noting that under the FCRA “common law claims cannot be brought against 
entities . . . except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure”). 
 93. Commentators have noted the FCRA’s inefficacy for individual victims: 
[T]he reporting and reinvestigation scheme outlined in the FCRA does not 
contemplate an unrelated third-party opening accounts in a victim’s name, and tying 
those accounts to a victim’s established credit history. As a result, under the FCRA 
the victim, the reporting agency, users and furnishers all may reasonably comply with 
the Act and yet the victim receives no relief. 
Couch, supra note 20, at 592–93 (footnote omitted). 
 94. See id. at 596 (discussing the respective burdens on consumers and commerce to 
facilitate the credit-based system by guarding against identity theft). 
 95. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (2003). 
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to the FCRA may strengthen a plaintiff’s private right of action 
against credit agencies, they will not improve the status quo for those 
identity theft victims wishing to bring claims for the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud.96 
Because the FCRA does not encompass “problems relating to 
the solicitation and issuing of credit cards,”97 it follows that its 
immunity provisions would not bar state recognition of an imposter 
fraud claim. The FCRA’s absolute immunity provision “clearly does 
not apply to those tort claims that only involve the Bank’s actions 
independent of its function as a furnisher of credit information.”98 
Similarly, the qualified immunity provision only protects credit 
furnishers from state law claims involving information disclosure.99 
Thus, neither form of FCRA immunity governs the typical negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud plaintiff’s claim that a financial 
institution negligently issued a credit card to an imposter.100 
Identity theft victims should not be penalized by the FCRA’s 
existence when it provides them no assistance in reclaiming their 
identities and property. The Huggins court emphasized that without 
this common law tort, plaintiffs retain recourse through statutory 
channels.101 Such an approach may provide some protection for those 
identity theft victims with viable FCRA claims, but it is inadequate 
for those unable to pursue FCRA claims. Thus, given that negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud claims are not barred by the FCRA’s 
preemption provisions, courts should not deny all such claims on the 
basis that some victims might also have a statutory remedy.102 
 
 96. See Oscar Marquis, Who Can be Held Liable for Identity Theft?, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 
2003, at 18A (“[T]he FCRA amendment[’s] focus is on helping consumers who are already 
victims—helping with the ‘credit history restoration.’”). Further, “none of these procedures are 
likely to do anything to prevent identity theft from occurring . . . Congress imposed no new 
obligations on credit card issuers and created no liability or cause of action similar to ‘negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud.’” Id. 
 97. Yelder v. Credit Bureau of Montgomery, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 
 98. Stafford, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 787; see also Young, supra note 78, at 176 (“Claims against 
a creditor for the negligent opening of an account . . . are not preempted.”). 
 99. Stafford, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
 100. See Yelder, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (“[T]he FCRA does not deal with problems relating 
to the solicitation and issuing of credit cards.”). 
 101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 102. As a general rule, when a claimant’s common law claim is neither expressly nor 
impliedly preempted by a statute and does not rely upon that statute, the claimant may typically 
assert the common law claim. See, e.g., Poncy v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 548 So. 2d 1196, 
1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (interpreting a federal statute and holding that 
plaintiffs “are not preempted from asserting their common law claims”); see generally Cipollone 
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Another statutory outlet for victims of identity theft, the Identity 
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act,103 also fails to help victims of 
negligently enabled imposter fraud. This Act criminalizes “knowingly 
transfer[ing], possess[ing] or us[ing], without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, 
or to aid or abet, . . . any unlawful activity.”104 Although this statute is 
helpful in permitting victims to recover against identity thieves,105 it 
does not permit recovery against the financial institution that enabled 
the theft. Further, Congress’ intention in enacting this law was to 
investigate only those incidents of identity theft carrying large price 
tags.106 Ultimately, although well-intentioned, the Act is inapplicable 
to the circumstances of individual plaintiffs alleging negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud claims. 
Most states have enacted legislation to provide relief for 
individual victims of identity theft.107 Although states have taken steps 
to benefit identity theft victims,108 their incentive to provide pro-victim 
identity theft legislation was strictly curtailed after the enactment of 
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT).109 FACT, an 
amendment to the FCRA, extends FCRA preemption of state law by 
“preempt[ing] any more-stringent state identity theft laws after 
 
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (providing an explication of the law on preemption 
and permitting common law claims after concluding that they were not preempted). 
 103. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 
Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000)). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000). 
 105. Although recovery against the identity thief may sometimes be personally validating to 
the victim, it will do nothing to help victims when the thieves from whom they seek reparations 
are judgment-proof. 
 106. See Sabol, supra note 5, at 169 (explaining that because no federal money was allocated 
for this new law, “federal investigators will primarily focus on identity theft cases involving 
$200,000 or more and will have to ignore the small crimes”). To actually protect victimized 
individuals, then, “states must adopt their own identity theft laws to give local law enforcement 
agencies more authority to investigate crimes and prosecute criminals.” Id. 
 107. See Towle, supra note 7, at 301 (noting that “‘44 states have specific laws . . . and 5 
other states have laws that cover activities included within the definition of identity theft’” 
(quoting U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Greater Awareness and Use of Existing 
Data Are Needed 3 (June 2002), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02766.pdf (last visited Apr. 
9, 2005)); see also Sabol, supra note 5, at 168 (observing that Arizona took the lead in 1996 by 
becoming the first state to criminalize identity theft). 
 108. For example, Tennessee created an Identity Theft Victims’ Rights Act. Identity Theft 
Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-150 (2004). See generally Kristin E. 
Solomon, Facing Identity Theft, TENN. BAR J., Dec. 2004, at 12 (discussing the new legislation 
and its implications). 
 109. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). 
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January 1, 2004.”110 Although FACT’s primary purpose is to prevent 
identity theft,111 its provisions instead appear to provide a remedy by 
“respond[ing] to consumer claims of identity theft.”112 
Under the current statute-based regime, financial institutions 
themselves lack the incentive to do more to protect individuals in 
whose names they negligently extend credit. Financial institutions will 
invest in avoiding negligence only to the point at which it is financially 
advantageous.113 A financial institution is negligent if it fails to take 
precautions when the burden of taking adequate, reasonable 
precautions is lower than the probability that identity theft would 
occur as a result of the institution’s failure to verify an imposter’s 
identity, multiplied by the magnitude of injury that could result from 
this failure.114 Only when financial institutions factor in the true costs 
of injury associated with their negligence will they invest sufficiently 
in avoiding negligence. 
It would not be overly burdensome to require financial 
institutions to make reasonable efforts to prevent identity theft when 
opening bank accounts or extending credit; under the current statute-
only scheme, however, institutions lack the incentives needed to 
exercise reasonable care.115 Individuals victimized by identity theft are 
 
 110. Young, supra note 78, at 37; see id. (noting that a major complaint regarding FACT is 
that it “reduces the states’ authority to enact tougher laws”). 
 111. FACT’s full title states its goals: “An Act [t]o amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to 
prevent identity theft, improve resolution of consumer disputes, improve the accuracy of 
consumer records, make improvements in the use of, and consumer access to, credit 
information, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952. This language 
suggests that prevention is FACT’s main goal, yet the statute’s practical effect is to respond to 
identity theft after it occurs. 
 112. Towle, supra note 7, at 269. Much of the Act focuses on amending the FCRA, “which 
primarily applies to persons who make consumer reports (such as credit reports) or persons who 
use the reports or credit scores.” Id. at 272. Towle goes on to explain that “[i]n short, FACT 
seems truly designed to prevent identity theft, i.e., to allow businesses to provide needed 
information without becoming targets for actions brought other than by regulators.” Id. at 286. 
Although it is true that the Act does improve access to information, this does nothing to help 
individuals victimized when financial institutions negligently extend credit to identity thieves. 
 113. Following traditional negligence principles advanced by Judge Learned Hand, the 
breach of duty determination can be reduced to an algebraic formulation. See United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) (reducing the liability determination to 
three variables: burden (B), probability (P), and injury (L)). 
 114. See id. (“[L]iability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether 
B < PL.”) 
 115. Unlike the FCRA, the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort would place some 
of the burden of preventing identity theft upon a negligent financial institution. The FCRA 
“effectively shifts the burden of identity theft away from parties in position to avoid the damage 
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often astounded to learn that the offending financial institution 
provided services to an imposter without taking the simple steps 
needed to adequately confirm the individual’s identity.116 If financial 
institutions took reasonable precautions, they could curtail some of 
the identity fraud that occurs in the opening of bank accounts and the 
extension of credit.117 However, financial institutions currently lack 
incentives to adequately check an individual’s identity before opening 
a bank account or extending credit. In a competitive market, these 
institutions fear that a more rigorous screening process might scare 
consumers away to competitors who do not take such measures.118 
Employment of the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort 
would provide a much-needed incentive to encourage financial 
institutions to undertake sufficient precautions before extending 
credit or opening bank accounts.119 Without it, they will continue to 
employ suboptimal deterrence systems. 
Unlike many of the complicated legislative proposals offered to 
curb identity theft, courts are presently equipped to handle the 
 
through heightened controls . . . onto unsuspecting and relatively defenseless consumers.” 
Couch, supra note 20, at 593. Although the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort 
emphasizes the burden on negligent financial institutions, it does not create a new obligation; 
instead, it acknowledges and enforces an obligation that institutions should already owe to 
individuals in whose names they have opened accounts. 
 116. As one frustrated victim explained, “The most maddening aspect . . . is that it could 
have been prevented had the phone companies simply checked the identity of the person who 
established phone service in my name. Is it too much to ask that companies that issue credit 
cards, sell merchandise or provide services take simple precautions to identify their customers?” 
Sullivan, supra note 22, at A19. 
 117. See Sovern, supra note 4, at 358–59 (“Greater vigilance on the part of the [financial 
institutions] involved would have prevented many identity frauds.”). 
 118. As Beth Givens noted in her congressional testimony: 
[I]dentity theft . . . is rampant because of credit industry practices. Credit grantors 
make it all too easy to obtain credit. Many credit issuers do not adequately check the 
identities of applicants before granting credit. Instant credit opportunities are 
especially popular with identity thieves for this reason. Credit grantors are all too 
eager, in their competitive zeal, to obtain new customers. 
Givens, supra note 27. 
Victimized consumers are also frustrated by the ease with which an identity thief can 
obtain a credit card in another’s name. One consumer complains that her lender promotes one 
of its credit cards with the following teaser: “Why wait? Receive a response in 60 seconds.” 
O’Brien, supra note 7, at A1 (internal quotation omitted). 
 119. An attorney who unsuccessfully represented an identity theft claimant in New York 
voiced his support for the negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim in a letter to the Editor 
of the New York Times: “When the courts accept ‘negligent enablement of identity theft’ as a 
viable civil claim and juries begin assessing substantial punitive damages against banks and 
credit reporting agencies, this problem will be reduced.” James B. Fishman, Letter to the Editor: 
Hot on the Trail of the ID Thief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A18. 
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common law premise of the negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
tort.120 By its plain language, the negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud tort does not seek to impose blanket liability on all financial 
institutions when fraud occurs. Instead, it aims simply to place the 
burden of acting with reasonable care upon those in the best position 
to prevent it, and to provide an incentive for financial institutions to 
act with reasonable care when opening bank accounts and extending 
credit.121 The inherent difficulty in proving a claim for negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud serves as an internal protection 
mechanism: courts permitting such a claim can be reassured that they 
will not be opening the floodgates for new litigation, because in the 
current legal climate “it is very hard legally to prove negligence.”122 
Thus, courts are currently equipped to handle the claims of victims of 
a financial institution’s negligence in enabling an imposter to commit 
fraud. 
B. A Duty of Care Should be Imposed Upon Financial Institutions 
that Negligently Enable Imposters’ Fraudulent Acts 
When financial institutions act negligently, they jeopardize the 
financial well-being of the individuals whose information they 
manage. Because a quasi-relationship arises between a financial 
institution and an individual in whose identity it opens an account, the 
institution should be responsible in tort for the consequences of its 
negligent actions or failures. This Section will demonstrate how a 
duty can be imposed on financial institutions that negligently enable 
identity thieves. Although the remaining elements of proving a 
negligence action provide additional obstacles, this Section also 
 
 120. Identity theft reformers propose various intricate, complicated solutions designed 
either to prevent victimization or to assist victims once identity theft occurs. Although they offer 
potentially beneficial approaches to particular aspects of the identity theft epidemic, many of 
these proposals require substantial changes to the legal climate or impose massive 
administrative burdens. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 30, at 94–100 (proposing the creation of a 
“physical system that would make it possible for consumers to control the process of their own 
identification” (footnote omitted)). In contrast to this and other untested approaches that might 
require lengthy studies and congressional approval, state courts already possess the resources 
and ability to employ the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort. 
 121. If financial institutions are encouraged to act responsibly at the outset of their 
interactions with a potential imposter, this will prevent some instances of identity theft from 
ever occurring and render the process that ensues irrelevant. The goal of this tort is not 
exclusively to provide a remedy for identity theft victims; although this is its evident purpose, it 
also performs the important function of impeding would-be identity thieves. 
 122. Heller, Rehm & Reosti, supra note 84, at 20A (internal quotation omitted). 
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outlines how a plaintiff asserting appropriate facts can overcome each 
of them. Thus, courts addressing this tort claim should employ the 
four basic elements of a negligence claim—duty, breach, causation, 
and damages123—while sensibly considering the duties imposed upon 
financial institutions and their relationships with identity theft 
victims.124 
Because this cause of action is premised on negligence, a court 
must evaluate the four elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie case: duty, 
breach of that duty, causation, and damages.125 The first and likely 
most difficult hurdle an identity theft victim faces in employing the 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort is establishing the 
existence of a duty that requires a financial institution to protect 
against identity theft. A plaintiff must convince the court to impose a 
duty upon a financial institution to act reasonably when opening a 
bank account or extending credit to a new customer. Factors to 
consider in evaluating a negligence-based duty include “public policy; 
social considerations; foreseeability; the nature of the defendant’s 
activity; the relationship between the parties; and the type of possible 
injury or harm.”126 These factors favor the imposition of a duty upon 
financial institutions. Various policy considerations, such as loss-
allocation principles, indicate that these institutions are better able to 
protect against identity theft.127 Because they are engaged in business 
duties when they undertake responsibilities toward their customers, 
these institutions can reasonably expect that liability may ensue if 
they are negligent in fulfilling their responsibilities. Similarly, these 
institutions have sufficient awareness of their industry to recognize 
that their careless mistakes can ruin individuals’ financial lives. 
Different states place varying emphasis on the foreseeability 
factor as it relates to claims of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud. Although Alabama courts call foreseeability the “key factor” 
in both the preliminary determination of whether a duty exists and 
whether a victim’s injury could have been foreseen by the financial 
 
 123. 57A AM. JUR. 20 Contracts § 71 (2005). 
 124. See Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1369–70 (Ala. 1996) (providing a 
practical application of negligence law to a victim’s negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
claim). 
 125. See, e.g., Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 276 (enumerating the elements of a common law 
negligence claim). 
 126. See Key v. Compass Bank, 826 So. 2d 159, 170 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). 
 127. See infra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
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institution,128 South Carolina courts assert that foreseeability alone 
does not establish a duty of care.129 Whether foreseeability is 
examined as a stand-alone factor or as part of a broader 
determination of duty, it favors the recognition of a duty on the part 
of financial institutions.130 
Courts eschewing the negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
tort have likened it to a situation in which a plaintiff sues a bank as a 
result of a soured relationship with one of the bank’s customers.131 
The conceptual difficulties presented by a negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud claim, however, are much less challenging than in this 
scenario. Financial institutions cannot reasonably be expected to 
foresee that any individual in the world might have legal difficulties 
with one of their customers, because this would potentially place 
them in a responsible relation toward any individual or business 
entity who has any interaction with their customers. In contrast, it 
requires no intuitive leap to suggest that financial institutions should 
take some degree of responsibility toward those they presume to be 
their customers, and in whose names they have opened accounts. In 
rejecting the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court in Huggins framed the foreseeability 
requirement too broadly.132 Even employing its broad formulation of 
foreseeability, however, the Huggins court conceded that financial 
institutions’ lack of care could foreseeably result in identity theft.133 
 
 128. Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1368. 
 129. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (“Even though it is foreseeable that injury may arise by the 
negligent issuance of a credit card, foreseeability alone does not give rise to a duty.”). 
 130. It is foreseeable that when a financial institution opens a bank account or extends 
credit to an individual without properly verifying the person’s identity, the person may be an 
imposter with devious intentions. Financial institutions cannot claim that they are unaware of 
the prevalence of identity theft. 
 131. Known as the McCallum rule, this situation arises when a plaintiff sues a bank for 
failing to adequately monitor a customer’s account. See Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, 301 F.3d 
220, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing McCallum v. Rizzo, No. 942878, 1995 WL 1146812, at *2 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 1995)) (asserting that “a bank’s failure to investigate a customer’s 
suspicious activity . . . does not give rise to liability to the third party who is injured by the 
customer’s fraud” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 132. See Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (declining “to recognize a legal duty of care between 
credit card issuers and those individuals whose identities may be stolen”). The Huggins court 
failed to acknowledge that each financial institution should owe a duty not only to those 
individuals who seek services from that particular institution, but also individuals in whose 
names services are sought. 
 133. See id. (“Even though it is foreseeable that injury may arise by the negligent issuance of 
a credit card, foreseeability alone does not give rise to a duty.” (citation omitted)). 
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Thus, the negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim would make 
it possible for a plaintiff to establish the foreseeability factor, whether 
it is considered a dispositive factor or merely part of a multifactor 
analysis to establish a duty. 
In suggesting the imposition of broader responsibility on 
financial institutions, one author explained that “because banks 
occupy a position of trust and integrity in society the obligation 
should be greater than an ordinary tort duty of reasonable care.”134 
The negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim would not impose 
this higher standard but would only enforce the already-existing 
negligence standard for victims of financial institution negligence. 
Instead of continuing to permit a “see no evil, hear no evil” mentality 
among financial institutions, courts should require them to take 
responsibility for their negligent actions. 
Identity theft victims lack enforceable, contractual relationships 
with negligent financial institutions, but this does not automatically 
preclude them from having a “special relationship” with the financial 
institution as required for tort liability. Under traditional negligence 
law, no duty of reasonable care exists to protect a third person 
without “a special relationship or special circumstances.”135 It is 
disingenuous, however, to suggest that no relationship of any kind 
exists between a financial institution and the individual in whose 
name that institution extends credit or opens a bank account. 
Although the victimized individual is not a bank “customer” in the 
traditional sense, the financial institution acts under the presumption 
that the named individual is the “customer” when the imposter 
presents the named individual’s identifying information and the 
 
 134. McKelvey, supra note 12, at 1125. 
 135. Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1367; see also id. (articulating Alabama’s approach to finding a 
special relationship); Zappone v. Cavallo, 2004 WL 2896513, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 
2004) (“A duty of care can be established by a contract, a special relationship, or through a two-
pronged foreseeability and public policy analysis . . . .”); Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 
1089 (Ill. 2004) (recognizing the rule in Illinois that no one has a duty to control another’s 
conduct to prevent him from harming a third party without a special relationship with either the 
person causing harm or the injured party); Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 608 S.E.2d 80, 
89–90 (N.C. App. 2005) (Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing examples of 
special relationships recognized by North Carolina courts); Zambrana v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 
786 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (App. Div. 2004) (“[F]inding proximate cause in any of defendant’s acts 
or omissions would be too ‘speculative’ . . . where there is no ‘special relationship’ between the 
defendant and the injured party.”). Various state formulations of the duty requirement suggest 
the need for some relationship or special circumstances as a predicate to recovery. See, e.g., 
Volpe v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1998) (“[T]he bank owes no duty of care to a 
noncustomer with whom it has no relationship.”). 
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institution opens an account for the individual possessing that 
information. This misunderstanding continues until the institution 
learns of the identity theft.136 An identity theft victim is not a 
“noncustomer” of a financial institution in the same sense that a 
complete stranger is a “noncustomer.” 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also suggests that a duty 
should be imposed when a special relationship exists. “There is no 
duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him 
from causing physical harm to another unless . . . a special relation 
exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right 
to protection.”137 Although this section is traditionally applied in the 
context of physical harm resulting from dangers such as negligently 
driving an automobile,138 it requires only a small intuitive step to 
extend its principle to the relationship between the financial 
institution “actor” and identity theft victim “other.” In this way, the 
Restatement may place a duty upon financial institutions to protect 
individuals from victimization by an imposter. 
In determining who should recover for financial institutions’ 
negligence, most courts distinguish between customers and 
noncustomers.139 Although in a traditional sense they are 
noncustomers, identity theft victims are more like customers than 
they are like strangers. The relationship between a financial 
institution and a victim of its negligence is particularly difficult to 
establish in jurisdictions that hold to stark demarcation lines between 
the concepts of “customer” and “noncustomer.” Instead of examining 
the customer/noncustomer distinction in this manner, courts can 
 
 136. This is similar to the approach taken by the Patrick court, which discusses the 
unorthodox relationship between a financial institution and an identity theft victim. “The bank 
undeniably thought that it had a relationship with Ms. Patrick when it opened the account for, 
and gave checks to, an imposter; . . . [this] persuades us that there is some relationship between 
the parties.” Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1369. 
 137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965). Using language similar to that of 
state courts addressing this issue, the Restatement acknowledges that a duty can be imposed on 
a financial institution to protect an “other” as a result of their “special” relationship. See id. 
 138. Id. cmt. b. 
 139. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, 301 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Courts in 
numerous jurisdictions have held that a bank does not owe a duty of care to a noncustomer with 
whom the bank has no direct relationship.” (citations omitted)). 
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overcome this conceptual barrier by viewing these concepts in a 
continuum.140 
Courts have acknowledged that the relationship between identity 
theft victim and financial institution is not as tenuous as the financial 
institution’s relationship with the typical noncustomer. In Eisenberg v. 
Wachovia Bank,141 the Fourth Circuit distinguished the stranger-status 
of its victim from the status of the victim in Patrick.142 By emphasizing 
that the plaintiff had no cognizable relationship with the bank he 
sued, the Eisenberg court left open the possibility that a financial 
institution could owe a duty to an individual victimized by identity 
theft.143 
A financial institution acts in a responsible position toward 
individuals whose Social Security numbers and other private 
information are kept in its customer files.144 The responsibility 
imposed upon a financial institution in transacting business 
responsibly is both greater than and distinguishable from the 
institution’s broader obligations as a public facility. Unlike the need, 
for example, to provide security in its parking lot, the need to 
responsibly transact with customers is an “inherent component” of its 
daily business.145 Whereas a defendant bank may fail, by its inaction, 
 
 140. On such a continuum, with customer at one extreme and stranger at the other extreme, 
the negligent enablement of imposter fraud victim would be more closely aligned to the 
customer on the basis of this indirect relationship. 
 141. 301 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 142. Id. at 226. After discussing the duty imposed by Patrick, the court stated, regarding the 
plaintiff before it: “[The plaintiff] was neither a [bank] customer nor the person in whose name 
[the bank’s customer’s] fraudulent bank account was opened . . . . [The plaintiff] instead falls 
into the undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] 
customer.” Id. 
 143. See id. The large financial securities firm whose name the perpetrator used in opening 
an account, and not Eisenberg, “would be the beneficiary of any duty of care which Wachovia 
might owe to a noncustomer. Eisenberg instead falls into the undefined and unlimited category 
of strangers who might interact with Wachovia’s bank customer.” Id. This reasoning implicitly 
suggests that when a bank account was opened in the plaintiff’s name, this relationship may 
justify the imposition of a duty. 
 144. Alabama places banks in a fiduciary relationship with their customers. Patrick, 681 So. 
2d at 1369. Not all states follow this designation. See, e.g., United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 
A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[T]here is no presumed fiduciary relationship 
between a bank and its customer.”). Irrespective of the technical relationship between banks 
and their customers, banks may be reasonably expected to act responsibly when opening 
accounts for new and unfamiliar customers. 
 145. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1368 (“The security company may attempt to prevent crime, 
within limits; here, the bank, through its negligence or wantonness, actually facilitated the 
crime.”). In past cases trying to invoke a duty, plaintiffs alleged that defendants owed a duty in a 
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to prevent a crime if it provides inadequate physical security for its 
customers, that same bank actually facilitates a crime by negligently 
opening an account for an imposter.146 
Thus, banks owe a greater duty of care to individuals in whose 
names fraudulent accounts have been opened than it owes to 
strangers. In its multifactor analysis, the Patrick court employed a 
pragmatic, rational approach to imposing a duty of reasonable care 
upon financial institutions. Defining a relationship between a bank 
and an individual who has never had any direct contact with the 
institution proves challenging, but the Patrick court broke through 
conceptual barriers by explaining that the bank possessed a faulty 
impression that it had entered a relationship with Patrick when it 
opened an account in her name.147 Finding a sufficient relationship on 
these facts, the court stated that “[t]he fact that the relationship defies 
common categorization does not mean that there is no 
relationship.”148 Thus, the Patrick court avoided the label-based trap 
that ensnares courts bound to the customer/noncustomer distinction. 
In a later decision distinguishing Patrick, the Alabama Supreme 
Court held in Smith v. AmSouth Bank, Inc.149 that a bank did not owe 
a duty to a victimized noncustomer with whom it had no 
relationship.150 Unlike the misappropriation in Smith, where Smith’s 
employee used his job-related check-writing authority to wrongfully 
deposit Smith’s company’s checks into his own account with a 
different bank, Union State Bank subjectively “thought that it had a 
 
context unrelated to the defendant’s business. One such use was by plaintiffs who asserted 
premises liability claims against financial institutions when harmed by third parties on the 
institutions’ premises; these plaintiffs sought to impose liability based on their status as business 
invitees. See id. at 1367 (citing several such cases). This distinction was compelling for the 
Alabama Supreme Court. See id. at 1368 (distinguishing the identity theft victim’s case as 
involving “whether the bank owes a legal duty to protect the plaintiff in the execution of an 
inherent component of the bank’s business, whereas the previous cases applying the rule involve 
whether the defendant owed a duty to protect the plaintiff in a matter essentially unrelated . . . 
to the defendant’s business”). 
 146. Id. at 1368. 
 147. See id. at 1369 (“The bank undeniably thought it had a relationship with Ms. 
Patrick . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 148. Id. The lack of privity between an individual and the financial institution is not 
dispositive of the issue because privity is typically not at issue in negligence claims. See, e.g., E. 
Steel Contractors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 274 (W. Va. 2001) (stating that privity is 
“not required to maintain an action in tort”). 
 149. 892 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 909. 
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relationship with Patrick.”151 Critics of this cause of action fear that 
“[i]mposing a general duty for private parties [i.e., financial 
institutions] to protect the public at large from financial loss could 
open the door for a quantum leap in litigation to redistribute private 
resources.”152 However, courts considering this issue need not go so 
far as to conclude that banks owe a duty to the public generally; 
instead, they need only acknowledge a responsibility to those few 
noncustomers with whom the financial institution believed it had an 
ongoing relationship due to its creation of an account. Because this 
category requires plaintiffs to allege a special relationship to 
overcome the noncustomer hurdle, it will not open the floodgates as 
opponents of the negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort fear.153 
Once it is recognized that a financial institution owes a duty, an 
identity theft victim must still prove the remaining elements of a 
negligence claim. In establishing that the institution breached its duty, 
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant financial institution failed to 
meet a standard of reasonable care without employing res ipsa 
loquitur.154 After establishing duty and breach, an identity theft victim 
must then prove that the financial institution’s actions proximately 
caused the imposter’s identity theft. Victims must demonstrate that 
these events were part of a chain of conduct in the commission of the 
crime; reasonably foreseeable conduct does not break the chain of 
causation.155 Instead of simply furnishing appropriate conditions in 
 
 151. Id. (quoting Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1368 (internal quotations omitted). 
 152. Alvin C. Harrell, Case Note, Supreme Court of South Carolina Rejects Tort of Negligent 
Enablement, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 96, 99 (2003). 
 153. This fear stems from a misperception that by creating a cause of action that 
encompasses victims of true name fraud, a broad spectrum of individuals could suddenly sue 
financial institutions. This fear is misplaced, however, because a limiting principle exists with 
this cause of action; only individuals in whose names banks actually open accounts could employ 
this tort action, a point that is not well understood by the financial community. 
 154. See, e.g., Yelder v. Credit Bureau of Montgomery, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1285 (M.D. 
Ala. 2001) (finding that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply” in a situation in which 
fraud could have occurred despite no lender negligence). Circumstantial evidence cannot be 
used to prove negligence when the same event could have occurred irrespective of the 
defendant’s negligence. See id. (“As with a bank, a credit card provider who strictly adheres to a 
verification policy will not stop all credit card fraud. Thus, one could reasonably conclude that 
the fraud could have occurred without any negligence.”); Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 587 A.2d 195, 201 (D.C. 1991) (“[T]his is not a situation in which it is obvious, without 
expert assistance, that a merchant must have been negligent if he approved a fraudulent credit 
card application. . . . [S]uch a rule would in effect impose liability without fault.”). 
 155. See Shepard v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 385 S.E.2d 35, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (“A negligent 
act or omission is a proximate cause of injury if, in a natural and continuous sequence of events, 
it produces the injury, and without it, the injury would not have occurred.” (citation omitted)). 
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which the imposter can act independently, a financial institution must 
instead facilitate the imposter’s conduct.156 As discussed in regard to 
the imposition of a duty, identity theft by imposter fraud is a 
foreseeable result of financial institution negligence.157 Thus, in the 
paradigmatic negligent enablement of imposter fraud case, the acts of 
an imposter will not provide an intervening cause and are instead part 
of a continuous chain of events resulting in identity theft. 
Finally, a negligent enablement of imposter fraud claimant must 
establish damages resulting from the institution’s negligence. The 
financial losses endured by identity theft victims are easily 
ascertainable, but the intangible losses suffered by identity theft 
victims are more difficult to quantify.158 However, the tort system 
regularly attempts to calculate numerical values for similar losses,159 
and both tangible and intangible damages result from the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud, so both should be compensable under 
state law. 
Policy considerations such as loss-allocation and risk-spreading 
provide significant justification for this tort claim’s vitality. The loss-
 
 156. See id. (“An act or omission that does no more than furnish the condition or give rise to 
the occasion by which the injury is made possible is not the proximate cause of the injury.”). 
Additionally, for the financial institution’s negligence to be considered a proximate cause of the 
identity theft, the imposter’s activity cannot be deemed an independent intervening cause of the 
theft. See Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 433 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ntervening causes do not 
relieve a defendant of liability for its own negligence if the intervening cause itself was 
foreseeable.”). 
In establishing proximate causation for the tort of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud, the financial institution’s negligence does more than merely furnish conditions suitable 
for the crime, because its negligence actively facilitates the imposter’s theft. A financial 
institution might furnish ripe conditions for a potential criminal by improperly guarding a vault, 
but it actively facilitates the imposter’s theft by opening a bank account or issuing a credit card 
to an imposter without properly verifying the individual’s identity. 
The Patrick court discussed the integral role that the institution’s negligence plays in the 
imposter’s scheme and compared it to the role a private security force might play in preventing 
crime. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1368 (“[T]he success of the imposter’s scheme in this case was 
directly related to the bank teller’s failure to properly verify the identification presented. The 
security company may attempt to prevent crime, within limits; here, the bank, through its 
negligence or wantonness, actually facilitated the crime.”). 
 157. See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 158. This latter category of losses includes expenses resulting from regaining one’s identity, 
such as out-of-pocket expenses and lost wages. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 14 (Utah 1991) (“[S]uch losses are difficult to 
quantify and impossible to fit into a mathematical formula which translates them in any precise 
fashion into monetary values. [However, to] say that the law recognizes no loss for intangible 
injuries . . . is repugnant to basic human values and flouts basic principles of justice.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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allocation rationale provides a primary basis under which victimized 
individuals should recover for the negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud. Under loss-allocation principles, the party in the best position 
to prevent a loss should bear the burden of the loss if it is negligent.160 
When individuals are victimized in a manner that they cannot predict 
or protect against, and financial institutions can, by taking reasonable 
measures, prevent some identity theft, the financial institution stands 
in a far superior position—and in fact may be the only party in any 
position—to prevent a loss to both itself and the individual victim.161 
The negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim does not purport 
to hold financial institutions to an elevated standard of care, only to 
encourage them to adhere to reasonable practices. 
Attempts at risk spreading appear prominently in many loss-
allocation schemes and provide further rationale for the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud tort. Although financial institutions 
insure against identity theft losses and pass these costs on to 
customers,162 the true costs of identity theft are not spread, because 
they do not include the losses incurred by individual identity theft 
victims.163 If costs were spread according to the true amount of risk, 
these additional fees could be used to compensate identity theft 
victims. 
Identity theft victims deserve an opportunity to prove that under 
the particular facts of their individual cases, a financial institution’s 
negligence enabled an imposter in the commission of a fraud.164 Cases 
 
 160. See Couch, supra note 20, at 584 (arguing that in the case of identity theft, the “burden 
of restitution should be placed on those in the best position to avoid the loss”). 
 161. For example, loss-allocation concepts were frequently cited in Patrick, which 
emphasized both that the bank stood in the best position to prevent this crime, and that it could 
have done so with minimal effort. 681 So. 2d at 1369–70. “[T]he bank was in the best position to 
prevent the fraud that injured Ms. Patrick.” Id. 
 162. Financial institutions generally have insurance to cover the losses they accrue as a 
result of identity theft. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 45 (noting that the prevalence of insurance 
and the unlikelihood of restitution provide disincentives for banks to prosecute identity theft 
cases). 
 163. Unlike financial institutions, individuals are unprepared for and unable to cope with 
the consequences of identity theft. See Marquis, supra note 96, at 18A (“Lenders expect losses 
from consumers who do not repay or are not who they claim to be. But consumers do not 
anticipate identity theft, which also inflicts emotional harm and condemns them to the 
frustrating process of reclaiming their identity.”). For a discussion of the costs identity theft 
imposes on individual victims, see supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text. 
 164. Summary judgment is typically considered improper when a plaintiff asserts a 
negligence claim. See, e.g., Fowler v. Henderson, No. W2003-02862-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 
23099686, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003) (“Tennessee courts generally hold that summary 
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making blanket proclamations against the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud tort have done so in a legal vacuum. They flout 
multiple public policy concerns and refuse to consider the uniqueness 
of certain factual scenarios that would make the cause of action 
appropriate.165 Instead of cutting off negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud suits by determining that financial institutions owe identity theft 
victims no legal duty, courts should permit them to address the 
entirety of their claims. Thus, courts facing negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud claims should acknowledge the special relationship 
between financial institutions and the victims of their negligence. 
Only when this relationship is accepted will this category of identity 
theft victims be compensated for their actual losses. 
CONCLUSION 
The negligent enablement of imposter fraud tort offers a viable, 
common-sense approach to recovery for a particular class of identity 
theft victims. Because of the specific factual predicate required before 
courts can recognize a negligent enablement of imposter fraud claim, 
broad recognition of this tort will not present unreasonable burdens 
on either financial institutions or on the judicial system. Similarly, 
because of its limited scope, this claim does not threaten to 
undermine existing legislation that combats identity theft. Instead, it 
offers a considerable degree of protection for those identity theft 
victims who deserve, but otherwise lack, an attractive remedy. The 
continued viability of this claim will both protect individual victims of 
identity theft and impose an incentive for financial institutions to act 
with reasonable care in opening bank accounts or extending credit. In 
 
judgment is inappropriate in negligence cases.”). Particularly in negligence claims, courts should 
evaluate the individual facts and circumstances of each case, rather than making conclusive 
determinations of law. See, e.g., Hebert v. Veterans Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 694 So. 2d 993, 996 
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (articulating that such cases should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis); 
Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 628 N.W.2d 697, 704–05 (Neb. 2001) (asserting 
that a finding of negligence requires an examination of the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case). 
 165. E.g., Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195–96 (App. Div. 1998); Huggins, 585 
S.E.2d at 276–78. In both of these cases, the court’s brief analysis did not include or reflect the 
injustices that victims endured as a result of the financial institutions’ negligence in enabling 
imposter activity. See David E. Worsley, Fair Credit Reporting Cases Illustrate Risks for Credit 
Reporting Agencies, Creditors, and Lawyers, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 68, 72 (2002) 
(criticizing Polzer’s holding that “banks are not liable for such negligence, even when they failed 
to take any steps whatsoever to confirm the applicant’s identity and where they could have 
easily and inexpensively done so”). 
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achieving this two-fold purpose, the negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud tort will alleviate some of the burden identity theft poses on 
individual victims. 
Courts recognizing this tort must still, however, define its 
boundaries. There may be reasons to distinguish between banks that 
open checking accounts and lenders that extend credit, or between 
situations in which this common law claim is the only remedy 
available to a particular victim and those in which statutory remedies 
are available. The few cases applying this tort to permit recovery for 
identity theft victims demonstrate that it can offer recourse for 
individuals genuinely harmed by true name fraud. Regardless of the 
route taken by courts interpreting this claim, the negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud tort deserves consideration as a 
sensible approach to a complex, pervasive, and escalating problem. 
